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Abstract: The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in the United States creates incentives for 
potential aged recipients to reduce labor supply prior to becoming eligible, and past research finds 
evidence of such behavior for older men.  There may be a migration response to across-state variation in 
SSI benefits, which is of interest in its own right and can bias estimates of the effects of SSI benefits on 
labor supply.  We fail to find evidence that older individuals migrate in response to SSI benefits, or that 
the labor supply disincentive effects of SSI are spurious and instead reflect migration behavior.  
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The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides a safety net for the elderly, blind, and 
disabled.  The federal program sets its own maximum benefit levels, and many states supplement these 
benefits, in some cases substantially.  The SSI program is means-tested and imposes both income and 
asset limits.  As such, those on the margin of eligibility for the elderly component of the program—which 
is the focus of our paper—face incentives to reduce labor supply (or earnings) prior to becoming eligible.  
Our past research has consistently found evidence that older men likely to be eligible for SSI at age 65 
reduce their labor supply in the years immediately before the age of eligibility (Neumark and Powers, 
2000, 2003/2004, and 2005).  In contrast, these incentives are far less likely to play a role for participants 
in the disabled and especially the blind components of the program, which we generally ignore in this 
paper.  This research on the effects of means-tested income support programs on labor supply of the 
elderly complements a much wider body of research on similar effects of welfare programs for younger 
individuals and families (e.g., Moffitt, 1992; Blank, 2002).  In addition, both the asset and income limits 
create incentives to reduce saving near the age of eligibility; evidence that SSI also leads to dissaving 
among likely eligibles approaching age 65 is reported in Neumark and Powers (1998).   
In this paper, we consider another question concerning the effects of the SSI program that also 
follows naturally from a similar question asked with regard to other welfare programs.  Specifically, for 
the first time we take up the question of migration responses to SSI.  The migration question is of interest 
in its own right, as “welfare magnets” are an important issue in the welfare literature (e.g., Moffitt, 1992; 
Blank, 1988).  In addition, the migration question is of interest because migration that responds to SSI 
benefits, and is potentially related to employment, might affect the estimation of the effects of SSI on 
labor supply.   
Our previous research has studied the effects of the SSI program on the labor supply of older men 
as they approach age 65—the SSI eligibility age for the aged program—using a variety of data sets 
including the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
and social security administrative data.  The evidence indicates that among those likely to be eligible for   
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the program, and hence likely to be responsive to the income and asset limits for eligibility, higher state 
SSI supplements are associated with lower labor supply.  The causal mechanism that we presume to 
underlie this association is that higher state supplements make SSI more attractive, and therefore create 
stronger incentives to adjust labor supply so as to be eligible for SSI.  In addition, we have shown that the 
eligibility for early social security retirement benefits at age 62 enhances the labor supply disincentives of 
SSI beginning at age 62; at this age, potential future SSI recipients can replace income lost from reducing 
labor supply by taking early social security retirement.  This occurs without any long-lasting early 
retirement “penalty,” since this penalty is negated once the household gets on SSI at age 65 (Powers and 
Neumark, 2003 and 2005).  Correspondingly, our work on labor supply finds evidence of the sharpest 
labor supply effects for 62-64 year-olds. 
A key assumption in this past work is that state of residence—which is critical because it 
determines the SSI benefit an individual faces—is treated as fixed.  We have ignored the possibility that 
individuals migrate in part in response to SSI benefits.  Given the dramatic supplementation of SSI 
benefits in some states, a migration response to these benefits cannot be dismissed.  For example, as of 
January 2000, the maximum federal benefit was $512 for individuals and $769 for couples (both 
individuals aged 65 or over).  In that same year the maximum individual (couple) benefit—including both 
federal and state benefits—was $874 ($1,297) in Alaska, $747 ($1,094) in Connecticut, and $692 
($1,229) in California.  Especially for older individuals—for whom migration may be more likely around 
the time of retirement—migration that is associated with SSI benefits can lead to bias in estimates of the 
effects of SSI benefits on labor supply; depending on retirement and migration behavior, the disincentive 
effects can be overstated or understated, as explained later. 
The issue of the responsiveness of migration to SSI benefits is also important in its own right, 
without reference to its implications for bias in the estimates of labor supply disincentive effects.  In the 
welfare literature, there is a long-standing concern that potential program eligibles migrate to states with 
higher benefits (Moffitt, 1992, provides a review, and newer contributions are Enchautegui, 1997; Levine 
and Zimmerman, 1999; and Meyer, 2000).  The possibility of this migration response is potentially   
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important politically.  A high response makes generous benefits less attractive to policy makers, by 
increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits to those who, at least initially, are not state residents.  This 
concern led some states to try to offer lower welfare benefits or tighten time limits for individuals who 
recently moved into a state, but such efforts were declared unconstitutional (under the 14
th amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution) in 1999 in the Saenz v. Roe decision (Meyer, 2000).  At its worst, a perceived high 
migration response on the part of policymakers can set off what has been termed a “race to the bottom” as 
states cut benefits in the hope that other states will pick up the burden of income support for the poor 
(e.g., Brueckner, 2000; Figlio, et al., 1999).  Similar issues can arise, of course, with respect to migration 
across international borders, depending on the eligibility of international immigrants for government 
benefits in the host country.     
To study the migration response to SSI and its implications for labor supply estimates, in this 
paper we use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Decennial Censuses of Population, with which we can 
study both labor supply and migration.  Changes in SSI benefits over time, and more importantly 
variation in state supplements to SSI benefits, can be used to infer the effects of SSI on behavior of those 
nearing eligibility for the program, or those already eligible for the program.  We first briefly use the data 
to replicate our earlier analyses of the disincentive effects of SSI on labor supply.  Then, because the 
Census data include information on inter-state moves in the previous five years, we examine the 
relationships between SSI benefits and migration and whether they lead to biased estimates of the effects 
of the SSI program on labor supply.   
II. The SSI Program  
The SSI program was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1972 and begun in 1974.  Prior to that 
year, three separate programs—established in the original Social Security Act of 1935 and its 1950 
amendments—provided means-tested assistance for individuals who were either ineligible for social 
security or whose social security benefits were inadequate: Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid 
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled.  Federal law established only broad guidelines for these three 
programs, and states had great flexibility in setting program rules and benefit levels (including assessing   
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needs on a case-by-case basis).  SSI was established to provide a uniform income floor and common 
eligibility requirements, while states were free to supplement SSI payments subject to their own eligibility 
rules, with minor exceptions noted below.  The SSI program comprises a substantial potential source of 
income for the elderly poor.  Federal SSI, when combined with Food Stamps, brings an elderly 
household’s resources close to the federal poverty line.     
States can choose an optional benefit supplement.  They can administer the supplemental program 
themselves, or choose to have the Social Security Administration administer their supplemental programs 
as long as they maintain the same eligibility rules as the federal program (except that they are allowed to 
exclude additional items from income in determining eligibility for the state supplement).  As already 
noted, the state supplementation can be quite dramatic.  Table 1 lists the maximum state supplements and 
federal benefits for individuals and for couples (paid when both individuals are aged 65 or over), for the 
years covered by our Census data.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Aside from states simply choosing higher SSI supplements, Congress initially imposed 
mandatory supplements to ensure that in no state would citizens already in state programs receive lower 
benefits in the federal program than they had previously received under the state program.  However, 
because these mandatory supplements did not apply to individuals first becoming eligible for SSI in 1974 
or later, and we study behavior of individuals approaching the age of eligibility for SSI, we need not 
account for them.  In addition, some constraints were imposed on states’ ability to alter supplemental 
payments; in 1976 Congress mandated that states pass along cost-of-living increases in federal benefits 
(to avoid states cutting their benefits to offset these increases); see U.S. Social Security Administration 
(2002) and U.S. Committee on Ways and Means (2000). 
SSI is a means-tested program.  As a consequence, benefits are reduced by income from other 
sources, including social security, and by financial resources.  Twenty dollars per month of unearned, 
non-transfer income, $65 of earned income, and one-half of earnings exceeding $65, are disregarded in 
computing the SSI benefit.  In addition, there are exclusions for certain home energy and support and   
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maintenance assistance, Food Stamps, most federally-funded housing assistance, state assistance based on 
need, one-third of child support payments, and income received infrequently or irregularly.  The 
disregards are not indexed for inflation, nor are they differentiated by household type (couple or 
individual).  (While some states vary their disregard amounts from the federal level, it proved difficult to 
incorporate this information given the idiosyncratic ways in which different disregards are applied and the 
detailed knowledge about income sources needed to assign them appropriately.)  The federal benefit is 
reduced by one-third for filing units living in the household of another, and states are free to vary 
supplements according to living arrangements.  We do not consider differentiation in benefits by living 
arrangement (but we do differentiate benefits by filing unit type).   
In most cases, the monthly SSI benefit is determined by the formula: 
   SSI benefit  = Guarantee - ½ Max{earned income - Min{earned income, $65},0}   (1) 
    - Max{unearned income - Min{unearned income, $20},0} 
    - {means-tested transfer income}. 
The guarantee is the benefit amount paid when there is no other income.  Earned income refers to the 
current earnings of the SSI receiving unit.  Unearned income includes income from private pensions, 
public pensions such as social security, interest income, and the like.  Means-tested transfer income (e.g., 
Veterans Benefits) offsets SSI income dollar-for-dollar and none of it is disregarded.  These deductions 
for other income are first applied to the federal benefit amount.  When the computed SSI benefit is 
positive, the filing unit is eligible for the federal program.  If there is any excess income, it is deducted 
from the state supplemental payment (U.S. Social Security Administration, 1994, pp. ii-iii), and the unit 
only receives a state benefit.   
Finally, a limitation on financial resources is imposed via an asset limit, above which the 
individual or couple is ineligible for any benefit.  As of 2000 the federal limits were $2,000 for 
individuals and $3,000 for couples.  The following assets are excluded from the limit: the prospective 
recipient’s car, home, and the land the home is on; life insurance policies with a face value of up to 
$1,500; burial plots for the individual and immediate family members; and up to $1,500 in burial funds   
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for the individual and his or her spouse.  As noted above, when states administer their own programs they 
have flexibility to set their own limits on and exclusions for income and assets.  In practice few states 
have different rules, and when they do the differences are typically minor (U.S. Social Security 
Administration, January 2000).   
The SSI program is large.  In December 2000 there were 1.3 million recipients in the aged 
component of the program (overall, 2 million SSI recipients are aged 65 and over).  About half of the 1.3 
million aged-program recipients receive a federal benefit only and about half receive a positive state 
supplement.  Total payments for the aged program in 2000 were approximately $4.8 billion (overall SSI 
spending was $31.6 billion), about 75 percent of which was in the form of federal benefits, and the 
remainder state supplements (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2001).   
III. Labor Supply  
Disincentive Effects of SSI 
We have fully developed the theoretical framework demonstrating why SSI creates disincentives 
for labor supply elsewhere (Neumark and Powers, 2000), so here we present only an overview.  We focus 
on a simple two-period model in which agents make their labor supply decision in the first period and 
retire (and potentially become eligible for SSI) in the second, and there is no saving.  Briefly, SSI 
generosity reduces work effort both infra- and infer-marginally.  First, consider the infra-marginal effects 
of a small increase in the SSI guarantee on the agent’s optimal choice.  If he will be a non-participant, his 
work effort is unaffected by SSI benefit generosity.  If he will participate in SSI, there are two cases: 
either his private income will exceed the SSI disregard amount, or it will not.  If his non-SSI retirement 
income will be below the disregard amount, additional work leads to both increased first period 
consumption and second period (retirement) income, and one can readily show that under standard 
conditions, optimal work hours are decreasing in the guarantee.  If income will exceed the disregard, then 
the only incentive to work is to maintain period one consumption, because additional private income in 
period two will be taxed away at a 100% rate by the SSI program.  Since SSI cannot be received in the 
first period, the benefit G cannot influence the labor supply choice.     
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Because SSI creates a segmented budget constraint, one must also consider how changes in SSI 
generosity affect the labor supply choice infer-marginally.  In Neumark and Powers (2000), we illustrate 
how an increase in the guarantee shifts both SSI-participation segments of the budget constraint out 
relative to the segment of the budget constraint for non-participants, encouraging SSI participation and 
reducing work.  In addition, an increase in the guarantee widens the range of work hours that produce no 
additional retirement income due to SSI policy, further discouraging work.   
When saving is allowed and SSI also has an asset test, the arguments developed above imply that 
saving to increase asset income post-retirement will be discouraged.  Clearly if asset tests discourage 
saving they will also discourage the additional work needed to raise the stock of assets that would 
normally be drawn down during retirement.  Moreover, assets that are drawn down prior to retirement can 
be used to offset reduced labor supply.  Thus, with saving in the model the disemployment incentives of 
SSI are likely enhanced.   
Empirical Approach 
Our past research (Neumark and Powers, 2000, 2003/2004, and 2005) has focused on estimating 
the labor supply disincentive effects of SSI.  Details are provided in those papers (with the most recent 
one paralleling most closely what we do here).  Here we only describe our approach briefly, in sufficient 
detail to make clear how migration might affect the labor supply estimates.   
Our equation of interest models pre-eligibility labor supply as a function of SSI benefits available 
upon retirement (at age 65).  But we are also interested in isolating the effect of benefits for those likely to 
be eligible for SSI—and therefore potentially responsive to SSI benefit levels.  Because we estimate 
models for labor supply prior to eligibility for SSI, we do not observe actual SSI participation for those 
for whom we want to study labor supply, but instead can only predict those likely to participate.  We do 
this by estimating probit models for SSI participation for men aged at least 65, and using the estimates 
coupled with characteristics of those under age 65 to assign a value of the likelihood of future SSI 
participation, categorizing those with a predicted probability of participation above a particular cutoff as 
“likely participants,” and the others as “unlikely participants.”  Research in the welfare literature has   
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categorized individuals into treatment or control groups based on a single exogenous characteristic (e.g., 
family structure or education).  Our framework can be viewed as broadening this approach to allow a 
multitude of exogenous factors to determine control and treatment group categorizations.  
  
In estimating the effects of SSI supplements on pre-eligibility labor supply, we use the real 
maximum monthly federal plus state SSI benefit for individuals or couples.  We focus on individuals aged 
62-64, for three reasons.  First, given stochastic influences on earnings and wealth, older workers can 
form better predictions of post-retirement income.  Second, we suspect that workers pay more attention to 
the potential receipt of SSI benefits as they approach the eligibility age.  And third, the eligibility for early 
social security retirement benefits at age 62 likely enhances the labor supply disincentives of SSI 
beginning at age 62 (Powers and Neumark, 2003 and 2005), consistent with our earlier findings that labor 
supply disincentive effects were sharpest for 62-64 year-olds (Neumark and Powers, 2000). 
We could begin with a simple difference estimator implemented for 62-64 year-old likely 
participants, relating a labor supply measure (Y), to the combined federal and state supplement (SSI), and 
a vector of control variables denoted X (including education, race, marital status, a dummy variable 
indicating that spouse is younger than the other by more than three years, the state unemployment rate in 
the corresponding year, and year dummy variables).  However, because there may be unmeasured sources 
of labor supply differences across states that are correlated with SSI, we use difference-in-differences 
(DD) and difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimators that introduce control groups to 
capture this state variation in labor supply.  One potentially important source of variation in labor supply 
associated with but not caused by SSI variation is other state policies that might affect labor supply (or 
migration) and that might be correlated with SSI generosity.   
Our first approach is to use data on younger individuals in the same state who are also likely 
participants, assuming that the state-level labor supply differences—perhaps stemming from variation in 
other policies—are common to likely participants across age groups.  In particular, we use a DD estimator 
that identifies the effect of SSI on labor supply from the difference between the coefficient of SSI for 62-
64 and 60-61 year-olds.  (We denote this estimator DD-CS, because it relies on cross-sectional variation   
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in SSI benefits.)  This estimator, though, will yield misleading estimates if the slope of the age profile of 
labor supply is different in states with higher supplements, incorrectly attributing this difference to an 
effect of SSI benefits.  One way to net out differences in age profiles of labor supply is to introduce 
unlikely participants, assuming that they have the same age profile of labor supply as the likely 
participants in the same state but are unresponsive to SSI benefits, and using a DDD estimator (denoted 
DDD-CS).  In this case, we use the sample of all 60-64 year-olds and identify the effect of SSI from the 
extent to which the difference in Y between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old likely participants, relative 
to the difference between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old unlikely participants, varies with the state 
SSI benefit.   
A potential limitation of this DDD estimator concerns the validity of using unlikely participants 
to control for variation in the age profile of labor supply for the likely participants, as the unlikely 
participants may be quite different from likely participants, and also quite heterogeneous themselves.  
With repeated cross-sections with variation in state-level benefits across time, however, we can avoid 
this, constructing a DD estimator that relies only on using 62-64 year-old likely participants—but in 
different years—as controls.  To do this, we augment our model to include state dummy variables, and re-
estimate the model for 62-64 year-old likely participants.  In this case, we identify the effects of SSI from 
the differences in labor supply changes over time across states with different changes in SSI benefit 
generosity.  We prefer this DD estimator because it uses observations on exactly the same types of 
individuals—likely participants aged 62-64—to obtain a control group.  (We denote this estimator DD-
TS, because it relies on time-series variation in SSI benefits.)  Because this estimator does not use 
younger likely participants as a control group, estimated labor supply effects of SSI are not contaminated 
by possible differences across states in age profiles of labor supply. 
Nonetheless, there is the possibility of changes over time in labor supply that are spuriously 
correlated with time-series changes in benefit generosity—perhaps because of other policy changes.  In 
that case, we again want to introduce a control group that exhibits the same time-series changes in labor 
supply as the older likely participants, but for which these changes are attributable to factors other than   
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SSI.  Paralleling the earlier discussion, we can use younger likely participants in the same state, 
implementing a DDD estimator (DDD-TS) that uses 60-61 year-old likely participants as well, identifying 
the effects of SSI from the difference in the change in labor supply of older versus younger likely 
participants associated with changes in SSI benefits.  An important advantage of this estimator relative to 
the DDD-CS estimator is that it does not rely at all on using data on unlikely participants, who, as we 
noted above, may not constitute a satisfactory control group.   
IV. Migration 
Clearly, evidence on potential migration responses to state variation in SSI benefits directly 
informs the “welfare magnet” debate.  In addition, endogenous migration decisions may impact the 
estimation of labor supply disincentive effects of SSI.  In particular, all of the estimators described in 
Section III assign individuals the maximum SSI supplement in the state in which they currently reside.  
However, given that individuals can migrate from state to state, estimation based on this assignment may 
be biased if migration is associated with changes in maximum SSI benefits.   
Implications of Migration for Estimation of Labor Supply Disincentive Effects 
There are two principal channels by which migration can lead to biased estimates of labor supply 
disincentive effects of SSI.  First, consider migration after reaching the age of eligibility for SSI.  In 
particular, suppose that there is some tendency for individuals to move to higher benefit states if they go 
on SSI.  Assuming that these moves are in large part anticipated, so that agents are responding to benefit 
levels in their destination state, then when we estimate a model for labor supply as a function of SSI 
benefits, we are using the wrong SSI benefits measure, as it is the benefit in the destination state a few 
years later to which the individual should be responding.  As suggested above, the most likely kind of 
mobility we would expect to be associated with SSI benefits is moves of likely participants from states 
with low supplements to states with high supplements.  Individuals planning to make such a move may 
have a strong incentive to reduce labor supply prior to the age of eligibility despite presently residing in a 
state in which the SSI supplement is zero, which would tend to bias the estimated disemployment effect 
of SSI toward zero.  Thus, the mismeasurement of the SSI benefit to which some individuals respond in   
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making their labor supply decisions suggests that post-eligibility migration likely leads to understatement 
of the labor supply disincentives of SSI, hence strengthening the evidence we do find of such effects.   
The same conclusion holds if individuals going on SSI tend to move to low benefit states, 
because then their labor supply does not respond to the higher SSI benefit in their state of residence.  
Thus, this case can be interpreted as paralleling classical measurement error, where we measure with error 
the relevant SSI benefit level to which individuals respond, using the current benefit level instead of that 
in the destination state.  Of course the reality is more complicated than classical measurement error, both 
because many of the estimators use the supplement in interactions as well as main effects, and because 
there is a discrete number of possible values that the change in benefits can take.  Regardless, though, 
whether or not migration of those likely to be eligible for SSI is sensitive to SSI benefit levels is of direct 
interest.   
A second type of migration pattern is potentially more problematic with regard to our past 
evidence from estimating labor supply effects of SSI.  Specifically, especially among those with lower 
incomes and hence more likely to be eligible for SSI, retirement prior to the age of eligibility for SSI is 
common, more so in light of the incentives to take early social security retirement for those who will go 
on SSI.  Among those who retire before age 65, some may move to states with higher SSI benefits in 
preparation for receiving the higher benefits at age 65.  This is different from the previous case, because 
now we accurately measure the SSI benefits to which individuals may be responding, given that they have 
already moved.  For these individuals, though, an estimated negative relationship between SSI benefits 
and labor supply is generated not because the higher benefits reduced labor supply, but rather because of 
the joint determination of retirement and migration, with those who chose to retire—perhaps irrespective 
of SSI benefits—subsequently also choosing to migrate to high benefit states.  Thus, this pattern of 
migration suggests bias in the direction of overstating the labor supply disincentive effects of SSI.   
Estimating Migration Responses 
 
From the point of view of the welfare magnet debate, we are interested in migration that could 
occur either before or after the age of eligibility for SSI, since either type of migration pattern could   
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influence the number of beneficiaries a state might expect as a result of variation in their SSI supplement.  
Similarly, the preceding discussion indicates that evidence of pre- or post-eligibility migration is 
informative—in different ways—about how migration impacts estimates of the labor supply effects of 
SSI.   
Our framework for estimating how migration responds to SSI benefit levels parallels that in the 
literature on migration and welfare benefits—most recently Gelbach (2004).  In all cases, we estimate 
models for the change in benefits—most importantly isolating those changes associated with a move.  
Paralleling the labor supply estimators discussed earlier, we use specifications that identify the effect for 
likely participants in the age group of interest relative to a comparison group that might exhibit similar 
state-to-state migration patterns, but which is less likely to exhibit migration patterns in response to SSI 
benefits.  We should emphasize that we are not, in this paper, conducting a completely general analysis of 
the potential impact of SSI benefits on migration, but are instead more focused on whether there is 
evidence for the types of migration patterns discussed above that might bias the estimated disincentive 
effects of SSI on labor supply.   
The Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000 that we use to study labor supply also have 
information on state of residence five years earlier, to which we match states’ SSI benefit information for 
that period.  We first focus on post-eligibility migration.  To correspond most closely to the 62-64 year-
olds on which we focus in estimating labor supply effects, we look at migration of current 67-69 year-
olds, who are five years older.  For this group, we can also identify actual SSI participants, rather than just 
likely participants.  But paralleling the argument in Meyer (2000), if we condition on participation in year 
‘t’, then representation in the sample of participants may be influenced by migratory moves.  For 
example, all else the same, those who moved to high benefit states are more likely to appear in the sample 
than those who remained in low benefit states, simply because more people are eligible for some SSI 
benefits when benefits are higher.  That is, individuals who were initially in low benefit states and stayed 
in a low benefit state are underrepresented relative to those who were initially in low benefit states but 
moved to a high benefit state.  Thus, conditioning on likely participation in a way that does not depend on   
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SSI benefits—as we do—rather than on actual participation, avoids this endogenous sample selection. 
We also study pre-eligibility migration directly, by estimating the equations described below 
substituting 62-64 year-olds for 67-69 year-olds; the logic of our estimators carries over completely.  We 
begin by restricting attention to those initially living in states that do not supplement federal SSI benefits, 
and ask whether those most likely to participate in SSI exhibit a tendency to move to states with higher 
SSI benefits.  Later, we look at those living in the most generous states, and ask whether these individuals 
tend to retain high benefits by choosing to stay where they are.  Thus we look at migration from both 
perspectives, as a problem of whether to move and a problem of whether to stay.   
Specifically, in the case of “whether to move,” we look at those aged 67-69 in the Census year, 
and ask whether they have made migratory moves that increase their SSI benefits.  We do this for samples 
including migrants and non-migrants, as well as samples of migrants only.  The latter are most useful for 
trying to detect a migration response, whereas the former are more useful for trying to gauge whether 
there is any detectable migration response in the larger sample for which we estimate labor supply 
disincentive effects.  As Gelbach (2004) points out, it is the estimates from the full sample that are of 
most interest in answering whether migration biases researchers’ estimates of other behavioral responses 
to government benefits.  On the other hand, since we pool data from multiple Census years, non-migrants 
can also be responding to SSI benefit levels, for example by choosing to remain in a state that has raised 
its benefits.   
The simplest estimator we use is a difference-in-difference estimator estimated for 67-69 year-old 
and 60-61 year-old likely participants.  The 60-61-year-olds serve as the control group, to capture 
common state-to-state migration patterns for older individuals or families that would lead to changes in 
benefits—such as general migration to California, which supplement benefits generously.  But only if this 
pattern is stronger for 67-69 year-olds will this be interpreted as a migration response to SSI.  We do not 
want to simply use those a couple of years younger than those aged 67-69 as of the Census year, as these 
individuals may have also already made a retirement-related move upon either reaching the age of 
eligibility for SSI (ages 65-66) or for early social security retirement (ages 62-64).  Likely participants   
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aged 60-61 are less likely to have made moves for either of these reasons, yet may still tend to capture the 
migration patterns exhibited by residents of the same state who are older and likely to participate in SSI.   
Specifically, we define the dependent variable, ΔBENist,t-5, as the change in maximum benefits 
(individual or couple, depending on how the individual is classified) based on state of residence, between 
five years ago and the Census year.  We estimate the specification:  
  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α⋅OLDist + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist.       ( 2 )  
  
In this specification, α identifies whether there is a migration response to SSI benefits among 67-
69 year-olds, because it measures whether there is a change in benefits that differs for 67-69 year-olds 
relative to 60-61 year-olds.  We noted earlier that for non-migrants a change in benefits can arise because 
a state’s benefits changed.  However, these changes common to everyone in a state do not identify α 
because of the 60-61 year-old comparison group.  Similarly, any changes in federal benefits between a 
pair of years will be captured in the year effects.  We label this first difference-in-difference estimator 
DD1.  
A potential problem with DD1 is that the age patterns of migration may be different for those 
aged 67-69 and those aged 60-61 for reasons unrelated to SSI.  One way to address this possibility is to 
use an alternative difference-in-differences estimator that uses unlikely participants of the same age (67-
69) as the comparison group.  In this case the equation we estimate is: 
  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α⋅PARTist + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist.       ( 3 )  
 
In equation (3), α identifies the migration response to SSI by asking whether likely participants 
are more likely to make transitions to higher benefit states than are unlikely participants in the same age 
group.  We label this second difference-in-difference estimator DD2.  But DD2 also has a potential pitfall, 
because migration patterns of the more affluent unlikely participants may differ for reasons unrelated to 
SSI.  For example, they may be more likely to migrate to higher-cost areas in retirement (again, California 
is a good example), and these higher cost areas may happen to have higher benefits.   
To address this possibility, we use a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimator that 
uses 67-69 year-old and 60-61 year-old likely participants and unlikely participants.  This estimator is:     
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  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α⋅PARTist⋅OLDist + γ⋅OLDist + δ⋅PARTist      (4) 
 
       + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist. 
In this specification, α identifies a migration response only from the difference in the change in 
benefits experienced by older versus younger likely participants, relative to the change experienced by 
older versus younger unlikely participants—or equivalently, only from the difference in the change in 
benefits experienced by older likely versus unlikely participants, relative to younger likely versus unlikely 
participants.  Thus, this DDD estimator simultaneously accounts for differences in migration patterns by 
age that can plague DD1, and differences by likely participation status that can plague DD2.  (We do not 
estimate specifications including state dummy variables, unlike in the labor supply case, because we do 
not estimate migration-related specifications with benefits as a right-hand side variable.)   
As noted earlier, we estimate specifications (2)-(4) for the full sample (of the appropriate groups 
based on age and likely participation), and for migrants only.  In addition, we take these specifications 
one step further.  Specifically, whether someone moves to a state with higher benefits may well depend 
upon whether there is such a state in close proximity, because of moving costs, a desire to remain near 
family and friends, etc.  We therefore construct an indicator for each person of whether they could receive 
a non-trivial state supplement (exceeding 20 percent of the federal benefit) in a bordering state.  (Gelbach 
(2004) does something similar, but for a fixed radius, because in some regions, such as New England, 
distances between states are small and one might be more likely to move to a non-bordering state.  But  
Massachusetts and Connecticut both supplement generously and at least one borders all of the other New 
England states, with the exception of Maine.  Thus, using a fixed radius approach does not appear useful 
here.  We did confirm, however, that defining Maine to also have a bordering state with generous 
supplements (since it is separated only slightly from Massachusetts) had no bearing on the results.)  We 
then add interactions of all of the variables indicating either likely participation or being in the older 
group (PART and OLD), as well as their interaction (PART⋅OLD) in the DDD specification, with a 
dummy variable (BORD) indicating a bordering state with generous SSI supplementation.  For example, 
corresponding to DD1 we have:    
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  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α’⋅OLDist⋅BORDist + α⋅OLDist + β⋅BORDist + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist. (2’) 
 
Evidence of a significant (presumably positive) estimate of α’ would indicate that there is a 
stronger migration response for those who can obtain a higher SSI benefit in a nearby state.  The 
combined estimate (α’ + α) captures the migration response for older likely participants who face a 
bordering state with generous SSI supplements.  We therefore report estimates of (α’ + α) in the tables, 
which reveal whether, in comparison to the estimates from the earlier specifications, there is a detectable 
migration response for those for whom a migration response is less costly because of the proximity of a 
state with higher benefits.  We similarly augment equations (3) and (4) to incorporate the interactions 
with BORD and report the estimated migration response for those living in states bordering states with 
generous SSI supplementation.  Specifically, we estimate 
  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α’⋅PARTist⋅BORDist + α⋅PARTist + β⋅BORDist + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist, (3’) 
 
and  
  ΔBENist,t-5 = ζ + α’⋅PARTist⋅OLDist⋅BORDist + α⋅PARTist⋅OLDist + β⋅BORDist     (4’) 
 
            + γ’⋅OLDist⋅BORDist + γ⋅OLDist + δ’⋅PARTist⋅BORDist + δ⋅PARTist  
 
             + Xistψ + YEARitρ + εist, 
 
for which we also report estimates of (α’ + α). 
Finally, to this point we have described specifications estimated for those initially in states that do 
not supplement SSI benefits, for whom we might observe a migration response in the form of likely SSI 
participants moving to higher benefit states.  Equivalently, we can start by restricting attention to those in 
high benefit states, and see whether likely participants are less likely to move to states with lower 
benefits.  We do this by restricting attention to those in states in which the SSI supplement exceeds 20 
percent of the federal supplement.  Using specifications (2)-(4), a migration response to SSI benefits 
would again predict positive estimates of α, as likely participants would be less likely to make a move that 
entails a reduction in SSI benefits.  Given that most states do not exceed the 20 percent supplementation 
criterion, for this subsample we do not estimate the augmented specifications taking account of benefits in 




We use Census data from the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) for 1980, 1990, and 
2000.  These are stratified samples of the population, created by subsampling the full Census sample that 
received the long form questionnaire; the long form went to approximately 19.4% of all housing units in 
1980, 15.9% in 1990, and 15.8% in 2000.  These files include information about labor supply in the 
previous calendar year—specifically whether the individual worked at all, and if so how many weeks.  
We examine results using both labor supply measures.  There are also indicators of employment and 
hours worked in the week prior to the survey, but we do not use these because as shorter-term measures 
they are likely to be noisier and less likely to reflect longer-term behavioral responses.  In prior work 
(Neumark and Powers, 2005) with Current Population Survey data we found stronger evidence of labor 
supply disincentive effects of SSI with annual as opposed to survey week labor supply measures.   
We focus on males aged 60 and older that fall into one of two categories: heads of household 
(married and unmarried); and (2) married males who are not coded as head of household.  We do not 
include unmarried males who are not coded as head of household.  Sample members aged 65 and older 
are used to estimate the model for predicting the probability of SSI participation, based on whether they 
received income from SSI in the previous calendar year.  Those aged 60-64 are used to estimate the labor 
supply models as well as some of the migration models.  We also use 67-69 year-olds for some of the 
migration models. 
To the Census data we append information on SSI benefits at the state level.  Through 1983 SSI 
benefits were set each July, and afterwards they were set in January.  For the sample aged 65 and older 
that we use to predict SSI participation, we use marital status and the wife’s current age to assign the 
benefit level for either individuals or couples.  For the sample aged 60-64, for whom we will both predict 
SSI participation after age 65 and model contemporaneous labor supply, we assign the couple benefit if 
the individual is married and his wife is no more than three years younger than he.  In assessing the 
benefits of SSI participation, we assume the individual considers the couples benefit level if his wife is 
sufficiently close in age (three years or fewer) that he is likely to face the higher benefit level for most of   
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the prospective retirement period.  Because the Census labor supply measures refer to the previous 
calendar year, we use the SSI benefits available for that year (these are as of January in 1989 and 1999 
and as of July in 1979).  Nominal maximum state supplements for the years we study are reported in 
Table 1.  Looking first at columns (1)-(3) for individual benefits, and (4)-(6) for couple benefits, the table 
reveals that there has been and remains considerable variation in state supplements. Alaska, California, 
and Massachusetts have the highest benefits over the long haul (and Connecticut for most of the sample 
period, although at first it decided benefits on a case-by-case basis), while numerous states have rather 
trivial supplements.  The table also shows that there have been relatively few sharp changes in state 
supplements, but that changes are common.  Recall that even though the state benefit is often a small 
share of the federal benefit, many SSI participants receive only a state supplement or a state supplement 
plus only a fraction of the federal benefit, because of the benefit reductions for other sources of income. 
We report the maximum benefit and use it in the empirical analysis, because we do not know the 
SSI payments that are actually received by individuals and because these would be endogenous with 
respect to labor supply.  Also, our analyses use individuals under age 65, for whom actual benefits are not 
defined because the age of eligibility has not been reached.  Depending on the question being asked, using 
the maximum benefit instead of the actual benefit a person expects could bias the estimates.  In particular, 
with the data we have, we can ask how SSI policy variation in the form of the maximum benefit affects 
labor supply, and we can characterize migration responses to state SSI policy as reflected in maximum 
SSI benefits. 
Unfortunately, SSI participation is measured inconsistently across Census years.  As Table 2 
shows, in 2000 there was a question referring to SSI income exclusively.  But in 1980 and 1990 the 
question also included AFDC or other public assistance or public welfare payments.  In 2000, there was a 
separate question for public assistance or welfare payments.  We suspect the problem of other welfare 
payments is not too serious, because we are studying older individuals.  As the last column of Table 2 
suggests, SSI participation of men aged 65 and older in 1999 was 3.28 percent, while another 0.62 percent 
reported some other form of public welfare or assistance.  As shown in the last two rows of the table, for   
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1980 and 1990 the administrative data on SSI participation indicates participation nearly as high (in 1989) 
or higher (in 1979) than does the Census information that includes other forms of public assistance.  This, 
again, suggests that there is not a great deal of non-SSI welfare for our sample.  Given the inconsistency, 
though, throughout the paper we use the data two ways: first, using the cleanest possible measure in each 
year, which entails using the SSI-only question in 2000; and second, using the combined SSI plus public 
assistance measure in each year.  The latter approach, while prone to more measurement error, is 
preferable on grounds of consistency across the years.  Moreover, keep in mind that the data on SSI 
participation are only used to predict who is a likely participant, so whatever the precise measure in the 
Census, we are really most interested in predicting who is likely to have very low resources and be 
eligible for SSI.  It may not be critical to measure SSI participation perfectly in order to pick out those 
observations that face a higher likelihood of eligibility and hence may be prone to respond to the 
incentive effects posed by SSI, especially given that our estimates do not have a structural interpretation. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
VI. Results 
Replication of Labor Supply Results 
 
We begin by providing information on the sample and on likely SSI participants.  The first two 
columns of Table 3 report descriptive statistics for the full samples of 62-64 and 60-61 year-old men.  
Both labor supply measures reveal significant drop-offs after age 61; for example, the employment rate 
falls from 75.6 to 62.2 percent.  Estimates of the probit models used to predict SSI participation, which in 
turn are used to select a group of likely SSI participants for analysis, are presented in columns (3) and (4), 
for the two different ways of defining SSI receipt; the estimates have been transformed into marginal 
effects.  There is no way of knowing whether the individual was originally a participant in the aged 
component of the SSI program.  In principle it would be desirable to drop those with a disability—who 
might be receiving SSI under the disabled or blind components of the program—from the analysis.  But 
information on disability is not elicited in a consistent manner across the three Census years.   
[Insert Table 3 here]   
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In the SSI participation model, not surprisingly, the real value of the SSI benefit is positively 
associated with SSI participation.  The magnitude of the estimate implies that a $100 increase in monthly 
benefits (about a 24 percent increase relative to the sample mean) raises the participation probability by 
about 0.0064, a 14 percent increase relative to the participation rate of men aged 65 and over of about 
0.046, implying an elasticity of 0.58.  We would expect that variables positively related to lifetime 
income or wealth, as well as current earnings opportunities, would be negatively associated with SSI 
participation.  This is borne out in the negative effect of education, and the positive effect of black and the 
state unemployment rate.  Similar to what we found in SIPP data, we find that through 11 years of 
schooling higher education is associated with a lower likelihood of SSI participation; participation is 
lower for those with 12 or more years of schooling, although the marginal effect of education beyond high 
school is minimal.  This was apparent in a specification with much more-detailed education controls, and 
is captured in the specification reported here (and used throughout) by including an interaction between 
years of education and a dummy variable for less than a high school education, as well as a dummy 
variable for a high school education or more.  In addition, given that never married men typically earn 
less than divorced, widowed, or separated men, who in turn earn less than married men, net of other 
controls (Korenman and Neumark, 1991), it is not surprising that we find that never married men are 
considerably more likely to participate in SSI, and divorced, widowed, or separated men somewhat more 
likely, relative to married men.   
We use the estimates of this model to predict the probability of SSI participation of 60-64 year-
olds, so that we can identify likely participants.  To keep the “treatment” and “control” groups 
comparable, when we predict these probabilities we net out the SSI supplement, so that individuals in 
states with different supplements but with identical characteristics (as captured in the other controls) are 
assigned the same probability of participation.  (For the same reason, we do not include fixed state effects 
in the participation probits, since these would reflect in large part cross-state variation in SSI benefits.)  
This netting out of the SSI supplement means that one of the potential problems posed by migration 
related to SSI benefits—that individuals live in one state currently but are responding to SSI benefits in a   
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state to which they plan to migrate—does not create a problem in predicting probabilities of SSI 
participation.  But it remains a problem, of course, for the labor supply equation.   
For most of our analyses, we use a cutoff of the 90
th centile of the distribution of predicted 
probabilities of SSI participation to identify likely participants.  As reported in the last row of columns (3) 
and (4), the 90
th centile of the distribution is a about a 0.07 probability of participation.  This is, of course, 
a relatively low probability, but there are no doubt many determinants of SSI participation that are 
unobserved to the researcher, so that many individuals at this predicted probability have a much higher 
participation probability in fact.   
Regression results from implementing each of the alternative estimators described in Section III 
are reported in Table 4.  Linear probability models with robust standard errors are used for the 
employment equation, to ease interpretation.  (Estimated partial derivatives from probit models were 
virtually identical.)  In all estimations beginning in this table we report standard errors clustered on cells 
defined by state, year, age group, and likely participation.  We define cells based on the latter two 
characteristics as well as state and year because, effectively, the combination of benefits, age, and likely 
participation is what defines the policy variation.  Bertrand, et al. (2004) discuss the problem posed by 
serially correlated errors in panel data when treatments are highly persistent.  This is particularly 
problematic in panels with yearly data, and treatments that are, for example, dummy variables that are 
first zero and then (in some cases) always one.  In our context, this is less relevant, because the 
observations are 10 years apart (suggesting little serial correlation), and the treatments vary less 
systematically over time.  We experimented with their proposed solution by clustering only on state, age 
group, and likely participation (not year).  The standard errors were sometimes larger and sometimes 
smaller, but often not very different. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The two panels (A and B) differ in how SSI participation was coded in the probit used to identify 
likely participants.  The first two rows of each panel report estimates that rely on cross-sectional (cross-
state) variation in SSI benefits.  In the DD-CS estimates, which use the 60-61 year-olds as a control   
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sample, all four estimates are negative, although none are statistically significant.  Using instead the 
cross-sectional estimator that compares the differences between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old likely 
participants to the differences between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old unlikely participants (DDD-
CS), the estimates are centered around zero.   
The final two rows of each panel in Table 4 report the results from the estimators using the time-
series variation in SSI benefits within states, which we have argued are preferable because they do not 
rely on comparisons with unlikely participants.  The DD-TS estimator using only the 62-64 year-old 
likely participants yields negative estimates in all four cases, although estimates are insignificant in three 
out of four cases.  But the DDD-TS estimator, which might be viewed as giving the strongest 
identification of SSI effects on labor supply, yields estimated coefficients that are very similar in 
magnitude but more strongly significant; that is, the stronger evidence from the DDD-TS estimator results 
mainly from smaller standard errors rather than from different coefficient estimates.   
Using the estimates for employment in the last row of Panel B, the estimated magnitude implies 
that a $100 increase in monthly SSI benefits (or a $1,200 increase in annual benefits) reduces the 
employment rate by 0.012.  Based on the figures in Table 3, this implies an elasticity of −0.08; to capture 
changes relative to 60-61 year-olds, we calculate elasticities using the means for likely participants aged 
60-61 that are reported in Table 3.  The elasticity of −0.08 is smaller than the elasticity we found using 
CPS data (Neumark and Powers, 2005).  Aside from the different coding of SSI participation, the CPS 
data also have information on Food Stamp use, which we used to help predict SSI participation on the 
theory that it contains information on longer-run resources and also on the individual’s willingness to 
tolerate the stigma effect of participation in these types of programs.  For hours, the same increase in 
benefits reduces hours by 0.605, implying a similar elasticity of −0.09.  All told, then, although the 
Census data yield weaker evidence of labor supply disincentive effects than the other data sources we 
have studied, such evidence nonetheless emerges from what we view as the most reliable estimator.   
Migration Responses to SSI Benefits 
Next, we turn to the key new evidence that this paper presents, on whether either post-eligibility   
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or pre-eligibility migration responds to SSI benefit levels.  Table 5 reports the analyses for post-eligibility 
migration.  As for labor supply, the estimates are reported for the two different ways of measuring SSI 
receipt in estimating the likelihood of SSI participation.  This table (and the next) focuses on those 
initially in low benefit states that do not supplement federal SSI benefits.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The estimates of the first difference-in-differences model (DD1), in the first row of each panel, 
indicate that 67-69 year-olds classified as likely participants are if anything more likely to experience a 
decline in the maximum SSI benefits available in their state of residence, relative to similar 60-61 year-
olds.  However, although the point estimates are negative, none are statistically significant.  This is true 
for the full sample (columns (1) and (2)), as well as movers only (columns (3) and (4)).  These results are 
inconsistent with SSI recipients moving, post-eligibility, to states with higher supplements.  Note, also, 
that in every case the estimate identified for those in states with high supplement bordering states is less 
negative, which is the direction of change in the effect that we would expect from the augmented 
specifications distinguishing these individuals.  Perhaps they are more likely to make a move that does 
not entail benefit erosion.  Of course if we found the expected migration response entailing a positive 
estimate of α, we would expect the estimate of (α + α’) to be larger.  
For the second such estimator (DD2), which uses only 67-69 year-olds but uses unlikely 
participants as the comparison group, the evidence is quite similar.  In both the upper and lower panels the 
first three estimates are negative and statistically insignificant.  In column (4) the estimates are positive.  
Note that these estimates are perhaps the cleanest test of the migration hypothesis, since they focus on 
movers only and identify the effect for those initially residing in a low benefit state but with a bordering 
state that supplements SSI generously (equation (3’)).  Nonetheless, the estimates are well below 
statistical significance.   
Finally, the third row of each panel reports the DDD estimates.  Here, there is no evidence of 
migration to states with higher SSI benefits, as most of the estimates are negative, and all are statistically 
insignificant.  The one positive coefficient, for the full sample with bordering states with high benefits, is   
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very small (0.160 to 0.199); again, though, note that we obtain more positive (or less negative) estimates 
when focusing on those with high supplements in states bordering their origin states.   
Overall, then, the results reported in Table 5 reveal no evidence of a post-eligibility migration 
response to SSI benefits.  This particular type of migration response would lead, if anything, to 
understatement of the estimated labor supply response to SSI.  Thus, potentially more interesting is pre-
eligibility migration, since this can generate spurious evidence of labor supply disincentive effects of SSI.  
To address this form of migration, Table 6 reports results for migration among 62-64 year-olds.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results reported in Table 6 again, however, fail to reveal any evidence of a migration 
response to SSI benefits.  In the first two columns, which use the full sample (movers and non-movers) of 
62-64 year-old likely participants and the appropriate comparison group, most of the estimates are 
negative, and the few that are positive are very small.  In the subsample of movers, the estimates using 
DD2 yield larger positive coefficient estimates that represent non-trivial benefit changes, but none of the 
estimates exceed their standard error.  Thus, on numerous grounds including both statistical significance 
and for most estimates the magnitudes and even signs of the effects, there is again no basis for concluding 
that there is evidence of a migration response to SSI benefits.   
Finally, Table 7 looks at those initially in states that supplement federal SSI benefits generously.  
In this case, a positive effect of likely participation on the change in benefits would be more likely to 
come about from choosing to stay in a high benefit state, relative to the comparison group.  This implies 
that we are still looking for positive estimates of α in equations (2)-(4) as evidence of a migration 
response.  Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the post-eligibility response among 67-69 year-olds, 
and columns (3) and (4) present the results for the pre-eligibility response among 62-64 year-olds.  
Looking first at the full sample of movers and non-movers, in columns (1) and (3), there is no evidence of 
a migration response, most of the estimates are negative, and the few positive ones are small in magnitude 
and relative to their standard errors.   
[Insert Table 7 here]   
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The results for movers, though, give a somewhat different impression in this case.  For 67-69 
year-olds, the estimates for all of the specifications, in both panels, are positive, substantively large, and 
in four out of six cases larger than their standard errors.  Nonetheless, none are statistically significant.  
However, for the 62-64 year-olds the estimates are smaller, clearly insignificant, and negative in half the 
cases.   
Throughout, we have estimated separate models for subsamples of those initially in states without 
SSI supplements and those initially in states with generous supplements.  We explored whether pooling 
the subsamples would increase the precision of the estimates, but the resulting standard errors turned out 
to be about the same magnitude (roughly speaking, an average of those for the two subsamples).  If we 
were only increasing the sample size for populations for which the same parameters held, then we would 
expect reductions in standard errors roughly proportional to the increase in the square root of the sample 
size.  But since there is no reason to believe parameters are the same for these two subsamples (which is 
why we estimate separate models), the standard errors could go up because of worse fit.  
Interpretation of Migration Responses 
These results lead to a few tentative conclusions, regarding both whether there is a migration 
response to SSI, and whether this biases our estimates of the labor supply disincentive effects of SSI.  
First, strictly speaking not one of the estimates testing for a migration response to SSI benefits in Tables 5 
through 7 finds evidence of a migration response.  Second, from the perspective of estimating 
disincentive effects of SSI, and more generally from the perspective of policymakers concerned with SSI 
benefits playing the role of welfare magnet, none of the evidence points to substantive concerns arising 
from a migration response.  The conclusion regarding the estimation of disincentive effects of SSI is 
reinforced by the fact that only for 67-69 year-olds do we ever really find point estimates indicative of a 
migration response to SSI.  This is not the type of migration response that leads to overstatement of the 
labor supply disincentive effects of SSI; rather it is the pre-eligibility response that would most likely lead 
to such bias. 
This conclusion with respect to bias in the labor supply estimates can be demonstrated more   
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directly in one case.  One of the types of bias in labor supply estimates stemming from a migration 
response occurs when retirement prior to age 65 is coupled with migration to a state with high benefits, 
leading to overstatement of the negative impact of SSI on labor supply.  In some sense this is the more 
important type of bias, given that our past work ignoring migration finds evidence that SSI reduces labor 
supply.  The bias in this case comes from the endogenous choice of labor supply and SSI.  If, however, 
we instrument for SSI in the current state of residence with SSI in the state in which the person resided 
five years earlier (when we assume he was working), then we break or at least reduce the endogeneity 
between labor supply and SSI benefits.   
Results of this instrumental variables estimation are reported in Table 8.  We first report the OLS 
estimates for the smaller sample for which we have data on state of residence five years earlier, and then 
report the instrumental variables estimates.  As the table shows, in every case the results indicate that the 
OLS estimates of the effects of SSI are if anything biased upward rather than downward.  For example, in 
the case of the DD-TS or DDD-TS estimators, which we prefer, stronger evidence of labor supply 
disincentive effects results from the instrumental variables estimation, although in most cases the changes 
in the estimated coefficients are small.  This evidence runs counter to what we would expect if those 
retiring in the couple of years before age 65 are moving to high benefit states.  If anything, it is more 
consistent with them moving to low benefit states (such as Florida, a magnet for retirees)—which is 
precisely what our evidence on migration suggests.  Recall that we also described bias from migration 
leading to understatement of labor supply disincentive effects, stemming from measurement error 
attributable to individuals moving to higher benefit states after retirement.  However, one would not 
expect the instrumental variables procedure we use to correct for this type of measurement error, as SSI 
benefits in the state five years prior would likely reflect the same measurement error as SSI benefits in the 
current state.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
More generally, we are interested in interpreting these estimates from the perspective of the 
behavioral question of whether there is a migration response to SSI benefits.  Here, one might view the   
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evidence as less informative than we would like.  To fix ideas, consider the DDD estimates in column (1) 
of Table 5.  The estimate of α in column (1) measures the differential change in benefits for older 
individuals who are likely participants, and therefore captures the greater tendency of likely participants 
to move to states with higher SSI benefits (precisely because they would gain from the higher benefits).  
Because the standard error of the estimate is 0.962, an average change in benefits that was approximately 
$1.57 ($1.89) higher would be significant at the 10% (5%) level.  Given that about four percent of the 
sample moves, changes of this magnitude for the full sample would require that movers in the treatment 
group experience increases of these amounts divided by 0.04 to be significant, or $39 ($47).  If we instead 
begin with the estimates in column (3), for movers only, the standard error for the DDD estimator is 22.6, 
implying very similar sized effects for achieving statistical significance—$37 ($44) at the 10% (5%) 
level.  On the other hand, one might argue that policymakers should care mainly about the full sample 
results estimated for both movers and non-movers, and their implied changes in benefits, since these give 
a sense of the changes in SSI benefits paid out as a result of migration. 
In thinking about how informative the estimates are, one key question is whether it is plausible 
that those movers who can benefit from a more generous SSI program are likely to exhibit moving 
patterns that lead to relative increases of about $40 in state SSI supplements, relative to movers in the 
control group.  Obviously, we cannot answer this question definitively, but framing it this way is helpful 
in thinking about how informative the estimates are.  As shown in Table 1, for those eligible for 
individual benefits, there are between nine and 11 states (depending on the year) for which the state 
supplement exceeds $40, and it is often much larger.  For those eligible for couples benefits, there are a 
few more such states.  And these states are relatively geographically dispersed (e.g., CA, OK, CO, MN, 
NE, NV, WA), rather than, say, clustered in New England.  Thus, if there is a migration response to SSI 
benefits, it seems plausible that we would have seen a response that is statistically detectable in these data 
given the precision of our estimates.  
On the other hand, readers could certainly argue that they would like to be able to detect smaller 
changes as statistically significant before concluding that there is no migration response.  For example,   
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the estimates in column (2) of Table 7, indicating benefit changes in some cases exceeding $20, are 
arguably large enough to be substantively interesting to policymakers, yet are not statistically significant.  
To this, we offer three responses.  First, the standard caveat—that failure to reject the null of no effect is 
not the same as concluding that there is no effect—applies.  Second, in the other estimators (DD1 and 
DD2) the standard errors are considerably smaller, so we could detect effects roughly half as large, but we 
do not.  And third, the majority of the estimates are the opposite sign from what we would expect if there 
were a migration response to SSI.  Thus, the problem is not that we consistently obtain point estimates 
consistent with a migration response, but which are small relative to their standard errors.  Rather, the 
estimates appear largely centered around zero, so, hypothetically, if nothing changed but the standard 
errors were smaller, we would not reach the conclusion that there is the expected migration response to 
higher SSI benefits.  And finally, even in the case of the larger estimates in Table 7, these are for movers, 
while—as suggested earlier—policymakers are likely more concerned with effects averaged over movers 
and non-movers.   
Finally, it is of interest to contrast these results with those of Gelbach (2004), who uses similar 
data and a similar approach, but studies migration of single mothers in response to welfare benefit levels 
(in the period prior to welfare reform).  He finds stronger evidence of a migration response (in part 
because of more precise estimates, but more generally because of larger point estimates), but also 
concludes that the implications of this response for estimation of incentive effects of welfare benefits are 
likely trivial.  More interestingly, he offers a very natural interpretation of why we might see a stronger 
response among single mothers.  Simply put, migration responses may well depend on where one is in the 
life cycle, with those more likely to reap longer-term gains from higher benefits also more likely to move 
to higher benefit states.  In fact, he finds evidence of this life-cycle difference in his sample of single 
mothers, based on age of children (as those with younger children can potentially obtain the higher 
benefits for a longer period).  If we think about older SSI recipients, it is clear that although they can 
obtain benefits for the remainder of their lives, they may not have much expected longevity, especially 
taking account of their socioeconomic status as well as their age.  Coupled with the likely greater cost and   
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difficulty of moving, these life-cycle considerations could well dampen any migration response to SSI.   
VII. Conclusions 
When the generosity of income support programs varies across states, there is a natural concern 
over a migration response of those potentially eligible for the program.  States contemplating more 
generous support need to consider the possibility that the costs of the program will go up not only because 
of changes for current residents—including higher payments to those already residing in the state and 
participating, as well as increases in the number who remain eligible despite other sources of income.  In 
addition, they need to be concerned with increased inflows of eligible participants from other states.  
Conversely, states might believe that cutting benefits will save more than just projected savings for 
current residents, if doing so also spurs out-migration of eligible participants.  In addition to this direct 
motivation for looking at migration responses to benefit generosity, the estimation of behavioral 
responses to income support (and other programs) may be complicated when variation in benefits 
influences migration.  In particular, we consider the impact of migration on estimates of the labor supply 
disincentive effects of SSI, which are predicted by theory, and of which we have found evidence in past 
research.   
Specifically, we use Census data that permit both the estimation of labor supply responses and the 
examination of migration responses.  We first re-examine the evidence on labor supply effects using these 
data, finding, again, evidence that more generous SSI benefits reduce the labor supply of individuals who 
are likely to be financially eligible for SSI and approaching the age of eligibility for the elderly 
component of the program.  We then consider how migration responses to SSI benefit variation across 
states may influence estimates of labor supply effects that treat state of residence as fixed.  The most 
troubling possibility is that individuals likely to become eligible for SSI, who retire before age 65 for 
reasons unrelated to the generosity of SSI payments, choose to move to higher benefit states prior to age 
65.  In this case, we would observe a negative relationship between SSI benefits and labor supply among 
likely participants, but it would not be generated by a labor supply response to SSI, but rather solely by a 
migration response.  Finally, we present direct evidence on the migration response to SSI benefit   
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variation.   
We fail to find any statistically significant evidence that older individuals likely to be eligible for 
SSI in the near future, or already eligible for SSI, tend to move from low benefit to high benefit states.  
These findings are robust to the use of a number of different comparison groups to try to capture the state-
to-state migration patterns that exist independently of a response to SSI.  These findings, and additional 
evidence on labor supply effects, imply that evidence of labor supply disincentive effects of SSI does not 
stem from migration behavior that could, in principle, generate these findings, and similarly does not 
indicate a detectable migration response among those who are likely to participate in SSI.  While there is, 
similarly, no statistically significant evidence of a migration response among those who move, some of 
the estimates for this subsample are consistent with such a response, but the estimates are sufficiently 
imprecise that we cannot rule out a large range of possible parameter values.  Thus, one might conclude 
that the evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the behavioral migration response to SSI benefits 
that economic theory might lead us to expect, but that other concerns about migration responses to SSI 
benefits—including both substantive welfare magnet concerns and concerns about bias in estimates of 
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Table 1: Variation in Monthly SSI Benefits Across States and Over Time
a 
  Individuals Couples 
  1979 1989 1999 1979 1989 1999 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State supplements        
AK  206 317 362 296 462 528 
CA  148 234 176 348 563 450 
CO  37 58 36  178  299  321 
CT  NA 384 247 NA 551 343 
DC  15  15 0 30  30 0 
HI  15 5  5 24 9 8.8 
ID  54 73 48 61 43 17 
ME  10 10 10 15 15 15 
MA  129 129 129 202 202 202 
MI  34 30 14 51 45 28 
MN  34 35 81 45 66  111 
NE  87 38 27 94 60 13 
NV  43 36 36 83 74 74 
NH  29 27 27 20 21 21 
NJ  23 31 31 12 25 25 
NY  63 86 87 80  102  104 
OK  79 64 53  158  128  106 
OR  12 2  2 10 0  0 
PA  33 32 27 49 49 44 
RI  37 61 64 70  115  121 
SD  0  15 15 15 15 15 
UT  10 9  0 20  18    5 
VT  39 60 55 50  109  103 
WA  45 28 27 49 22 21 
WI  93 103 84 150  166  132 
WY  20 20 10 40 40 25 
Federal benefits  208.2 368 500  312.3 553 751 
a Benefits shown are for the calendar year, for states with any 
supplements over the sample period.  Illinois is omitted because 
the state decides the benefit on a case-by-case basis, as was also 
the case for Connecticut in some years.   
 
 
   
 
Table 2: Comparing SSI vs. Other Public Assistance, and Disability Measures Across Censuses
a 
  1980 1990 2000 
Census question re: 
SSI income 
Supplemental Security 
(SSI), Aid to Families 
with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), or 
other public assistance 
or public welfare 
payments -- Y/N and 
annual amount 
Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), Aid to 
Families with 
Dependent Children 
(AFDC), or other 
public assistance or 
public welfare 
payments -- Y/N and 
annual amount 
Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) -- Y/N 
and annual amount 
Census question re: 








Any public assistance 
or welfare payments 
from the state or local 
welfare office – Y/N 
and annual amount 
Number and % of 
men 65 and older 
receiving SSI 
(Census) 
N/A N/A  17,835 
3.28% 
Number and % of 
men 65 and older 









Number and % of 65 











a Census data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5% PUMS.  Only records with unallocated 
SSI or public assistance income are included.  Percent of records with allocated public assistance  
income is 14.6% in 1980, 18.1% in 1990, and 20.9% in 2000. 
b Source: SSA Annual Statistical Supplement 2001.  Denominator (total U.S. elderly population)  
from 1980, 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census counts.  Note that the figures in this row refer to SSI receipt  
in the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, rather than 1979, 1989, and 1999, as in the rest of the table.  
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Probit Estimates for SSI Participation: 1980, 1990, 2000 PUMS
a 
  Descriptive statistics,  
all male heads of household 
Probit for SSI 
participation
b 






Descriptive statistics,  
likely participants
e 












Ages 62-64  Ages 60-61 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Employed last year (%)  62.2  75.6      47.0  58.8  47.3  59.1 
Usual weekly hours last year  25.0  31.8      18.4  23.8  18.6  24.0 
Real maximum monthly federal plus state 
SSI payment (1982-84 $) 




365.14 368.09  365.22  368.17 
Education (years)  11.7  11.9      5.5  5.5  5.5  5.5 
Education x less than high school 
education 





      




      
Black  
 




34.7% 35.7%  34.6%  35.7% 
Never married 
 




12.9% 12.6%  12.5%  12.2% 




32.0% 30.7%  31.6%  30.3% 
Eligible for married couple benefit 
(married & wife age 65+) 




      




5.6 5.6  5.6  5.6 
                
Number of observations  402,035  280,957  1,377,883  1,381,619  41,312  26,624  41,280  26,571 
Mean participation probability      0.0471  0.0453         
90
th centile of predicted probability for 
60-64 year-olds 
   0.0719  0.0706         
a In columns (3) and (4), the marginal effects implied by the probit estimates are reported; standard errors are reported in parentheses, with t-statistics scaled to equal 
those in the probit estimation.  The probit includes fixed year effects.  In the probit estimation, the SSI benefit is divided by $100, so the marginal effect can be 
interpreted as arising from a $100 increase in monthly benefits.  When computing predicted probabilities, the supplement variable was set to its sample mean.  Men 
coded as “married, spouse present”, but with no corresponding spouse record in the Census, were excluded from all analyses.  The omitted marital status category is 
married heads with younger spouses.   
b Includes other public assistance for all years.   
c Includes other public assistance for 1980 and 1990, and SSI only in 2000.  
d Likely participation derived from probit on individuals receiving SSI and other public assistance for all years.   
e Likely participation derived from probit on individuals receiving both SSI and other public assistance for 1980 and 1990, and SSI only in 2000.  
Table 4: The Effect of SSI Benefits on Employment and Hours of 62-64 Year-Old Men
a  
  Employed last year   Usual weekly hours last year 
 (1)  (2) 
A. SSI probit uses SSI only in 2000, public 
assistance or SSI in 1980 and 1990 
  




   Sample: 62-64 and 60-61 year-old likely 
                 participants 
  
   Regressors: SSI⋅OLD, SSI, OLD, YEAR, X       
 
  




   Sample: 62-64 and 60-61 year-old likely 
                 and unlikely participants  
  
   Regressors: SSI⋅PART⋅OLD, SSI, OLD, 
                 PART, SSI⋅OLD, SSI⋅PART,  
                 OLD⋅PART, YEAR, X 
 
  




   Sample: 62-64 year-old likely participants     
   Regressors: SSI, STATE, YEAR, X 
 
  




   Sample: 62-64 and 60-61 year-old likely 
                 participants 
  
   Regressors: SSI⋅OLD, SSI, OLD, STATE,  
                YEAR, OLD⋅STATE, OLD⋅YEAR, X  
  
B. SSI probit uses SSI or public assistance in all 
years 
  
















a Linear probability estimates are reported for the employment equation.  The SSI benefit is divided by $100, 
so the marginal effect can be interpreted as the effect of a $100 increase in monthly benefits.  The SSI 
benefit is aligned with the labor supply measure, so that the benefit is for the year prior to the Census year.  
The vector of controls X includes education, race, marital status, and the state unemployment rate.  Standard 
errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses, and are calculated clustering on cells defined by state, 
year, age group, and likely participation.  ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ indicate that the estimate is statistically 
significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level.   All specifications use the continuous measure of SSI 
benefit, and the 90
th centile cutoff for predicted probability of SSI participation.  
   
Table 5: The Effect of SSI Eligibility on Change in Benefits in the Last Five Years of 67-69 Year-Old Men Originally in 










A. SSI probit uses SSI only in 2000, public 
assistance or SSI in 1980 and 1990 
      
  α 
 
α’+ α  α  α’+ α 








  Sample: 67-69 and 60-61 year-old likely 
                participants 
      
  Regressors: OLD, YEAR, X (BORD⋅OLD,  
                BORD in equation (2’)) 
 
      








  Sample: 67-69 likely and unlikely 
                participants  
      
  Regressors: PART, YEAR, X 
                (BORD⋅PART, BORD in equation  
                (3’)) 
 
      








  Sample: 67-69 and 60-61 year-old likely and  
                unlikely participants 
      
  Regressors: PART⋅OLD, PART, OLD,  
                YEAR, X (BORD⋅PART⋅OLD,  
                BORD⋅OLD, BORD⋅PART, BORD  
                in equation (4’) 
      
B. SSI probit uses SSI or public assistance in 
all years 
      






























a Sample includes men in states without SSI supplements in 1975, 1985, or 1995.  Migration is measured from that year to the 
Census year.  The vector of controls X includes education, race, and marital status.  All specifications use the continuous 
measure of SSI benefit, and the 90
th centile cutoff for predicted probability of SSI participation.  The dependent variable is 
the change in benefits.  BORD is a dummy variable equal to one if a bordering state has a state supplement for which the 
individual would be eligible (as an individual or couple depending on his classification) exceeding 20 percent of the federal 
benefit.  For these estimates states without bordering states are dropped.  Only individuals in the United States during the 
Census year and five years earlier are included.  Standard errors of the estimates are reported in parentheses, and are 
calculated clustering on cells defined by state, year, age group, and likely participation.   Note that the samples in columns 
(1) and (3), which include both movers and non-movers, are smaller here than for the labor supply estimation in Table 4.  
This occurs for three reasons.  First as noted in Table 1, Connecticut  decided their SSI supplements on a case-by-case basis 
in some years, including some of the five-year lags needed for the migration specifications.  Second, we have to drop those 
who migrated from outside the United States.  And most important, the migration question was not coded for the full Census 
sample in 1980 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980, p. 8); this accounts for most of the sample size differences. 
 
   
Table 6: The Effect of SSI Eligibility on Change in Benefits in the Last Five Years of 62-64 Year-Old Men Originally 










A. SSI probit uses SSI only in 2000, public 
assistance or SSI in 1980 and 1990 
      
  α 
 
α’+ α  α  α’+ α 








  Sample: 62-64 and 60-61 year-old likely 
                participants 
      
  Regressors: OLD, YEAR, X (BORD⋅OLD,  
                BORD in equation (2’)) 
 
      








  Sample: 62-64 likely and unlikely 
                participants  
      
  Regressors: PART, YEAR, X 
                (BORD⋅PART, BORD in equation  
                (3’)) 
 
      








  Sample: 62-64 and 60-61 year-old likely and  
                unlikely participants 
      
  Regressors: PART⋅OLD, PART, OLD,  
                YEAR, X (BORD⋅PART⋅OLD,  
                BORD⋅OLD, BORD⋅PART, BORD  
                in equation (4’) 
      
B. SSI probit uses SSI or public assistance in 
all years 
      






























a See notes to Table 5.   
   
Table 7: The Effect of SSI Eligibility on Change in Benefits in the Last Five Years of 67-69 and 62-64 Year-Old Men 
Originally in States with SSI Supplement Exceeding 20% of Federal SSI Benefit
a 








A. SSI probit uses SSI only in 2000, public 
assistance or SSI in 1980 and 1990 
    
  α 
 
α  α  α 








  Sample: 67-67/62-64 and 60-61 year-old 
                likely participants 
    
  Regressors: OLD, YEAR, X  
 
    








  Sample: 67-69/62-64 likely and unlikely 
                participants  
    
  Regressors: PART, YEAR, X 
                 
    








  Sample: 67-69/62-64 and 60-61 year-old  
                likely and unlikely participants 
    
  Regressors: PART⋅OLD, PART, OLD,  
                YEAR, X  
    
B. SSI probit uses SSI or public assistance in 
all years 
    






























a See notes to Table 5.  A state’s supplement is considered above the 20% cutoff if the state supplement for which the 
individual would be eligible (as an individual or couple depending on his classification) exceeds 20 percent of the 
federal benefit. 
   
Table 8: The Effect of SSI Benefits on Employment and Hours of 62-64 Year-Old Men
a  
  OLS, IV sample  IV  OLS, IV sample  IV 







hours last year 
(3) 
Usual weekly 
hours last year 
(4) 
A. SSI probit uses SSI only in 2000, public 
assistance or SSI in 1980 and 1990 
     








































B. SSI probit uses SSI or public assistance 
in all years 
     








































a In the IV estimation, maximum SSI benefit in the state of residence five years ago is used as an instrument for the benefit 
in the current state of residence.  The sample sizes are smaller than in Table 4 because those who immigrated from outside 
the country or with missing state of residence five years ago are dropped because the instrument is unavailable.  In the case 
of interactions with variable Z, for example, the interactions of Z and the benefit in the state of residence five years ago and 
Z are used as instruments for interactions of Z and the current benefit.  See notes to Table 4.      
 
 